I. INTRODUCTION
This Resource Letter provides a guide to the literature on Risk Analysis. This literature is often divided into two groups: Risk Assessment, the quantitative assessment of the magnitude of a risk, and Risk Management, the decision processes in reducing a risk or otherwise managing its existence. This Resource Letter is designed for someone who wants to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the process rather than someone who wants to fully engage in its practice on a regular basis.
Engineers and scientists have used the procedures that are now called Risk Analysis for a long time, but the use of the words, and the study of risks almost as a separate discipline, dates from about 1970. In the use of the words Risk Analysis, ''Quantitative'' is implied. Mathematicians, physical scientists, and engineers are inherently quantitative, and biologists and medical scientists are becoming so. Because risks arise in a number of situations, risk analysis, both assessment and management, has tended to follow several paths that have converged into two main ones. The first is a study of frequency of, and prevention of, accidents, both those naturally occurring and those that arise from a failure of human technology, with their direct and indirect effects on public health, and the second is a study of effects of pollutants dispersed throughout the environment.
Risk analysts collect numerical estimates of risks into groups for convenience of understanding. There are various ways of grouping risks. I usually make my first grouping by the way in which they are calculated, and this is also often the way in which they are perceived. I group them into ͑1͒ historical risks calculated directly from historical data; ͑2͒ new risks calculated by an understanding of engineering processes; and ͑3͒ new risks calculated by analogies with other processes.
͑1͒ Historical risks. All risk estimates use some sort of model to predict the future from previous experience. The simplest models are those used in calculating historical risks; ''the risks in the next year will be the same as the risks last year'' or the ''trend ͑usually downwards͒ of risks will continue next year.'' This makes the historical risks particularly easy to calculate and understand. It is easy to estimate, for example, the risks of automobile or airline accidents. Anyone can play the game of calculating such risks if the data are available. Unfortunately, the data are sometimes not in a convenient form. For example, numbers of deaths in a particular employment ͑the numerator in the risk equation͒ are kept by one agency and the number of people working by another ͑the denominator͒; errors of up to a factor of 2 can occur when the numerator and denominator refer to different groups of people. Typical sources of such data are: A particularly interesting risk for an analyst is the risk of being killed by a meteorite. The hazard is a large meteorite hitting the earth and causing enough havoc to destroy much of the human race in the way it is believed that the extinction of the dinosaurs occurred. The risk is the number of people involved multiplied by the probability of the event. It is interesting because the calculation is moderately reliable, the risk is larger than many that are heavily regulated, but the risk is usually ignored. For new technologies, particularly engineering technologies, the method of controlling risks used to be to try it out and if there was a problem to fix it. But nowadays, particularly in the energy industry where a large amount of easily available energy is concentrated in one place, the effects of an accident can be large, and even a rare accident is unacceptable. It is necessary to estimate the risk by understanding the engineering details. The first logically complete study of this was the Reactor Safety Study carried out by a group chaired by Norman Rasmussen and often called the Rasmussen report. In this study the engineering of the reactor and its safety features are considered in an ''event tree;'' a sequence of events initiated by some malfunction. It can be considered as a factorization of the problem where the probabilities of failure of parts of the system multiply, producing overall a small probability. The method, now called ''Probabilistic Risk Analysis'' ͑PRA͒ is applied much more widely than the nuclear power safety context where it was first developed. ͑3͒ Risks where causality is uncertain. But when the effect is delayed from the cause, as is the case for example when the effect is cancer, then the risk must be large for causality to be reliably attributed. The well-known historical example is the attribution of soot as the cause of cancer of the scrotum among chimney sweeps.
The study of these increases in an ailment lies in the field of epidemiology, which was originally just the study of epidemics. There are always many possible explanations of an increase particularly if it is small. The crucial issue is when a statistical association leads to an assignment of causality. The seminal paper on this subject was by Sir Austen Bradford Hill. Although often there is a small statistically significant increase in incidence of the disease in question, that increase is not usually considered a reliable indicator unless it is at least a factor of 2. As an example of the difficulty of assigning causality I note that the risk of cigarette smoking, which is 30% for a cigarette smoker, was not officially recognized in the U.S. for 50 years after it was first postulated. Early uses of epidemiology, and hence risk assessment, were to eradicate infectious disease. In these circumstances society must remove that last germ as the world almost has, and could do completely, with small pox. However noninfectious diseases such as cancer must be considered differently and are usually modeled as a stochastic process. The change was well described by Sir Richard Doll. When there has been no group of persons ͑usually occupationally exposed͒ where exposure and therefore dose has been high, it is not possible to prove a risk by epidemiology. For over a century it has therefore been common to use animals, particularly laboratory animals such as rats and mice, to understand risks of cancer. The understanding of how the data on animals may be used to estimate the risks for humans is difficult and contentious. I refer here to books by Calabrese and Rodricks and a paper by Goodman and myself. 
II. GENERAL REFERENCES
With these introductory thoughts I proceed to a discussion of the references that provided more detail. I list journals in the following order. General journals, Cancer and Environment journals, and risk-specific journals. Many of the most important results are published in the general journals, but detail is usually found in the risk-specific journals. The scientific literature on risk analysis is exploding. 
A. General journals

III. BOOKS AND MAJOR COMPILATIONS
The number of books about risk analysis has already exploded. In risk assessments using historical data the most important books are those that contain these data, some of which have already been mentioned. But in other risk assessments the understanding is more important. I put only the most important general books here: the books on the more specific issues are placed in the specific sections. The first two books give a fairly complete introduction to the subject. The first is elementary and has many examples for the student to work out; the second is more complete with many pages of references. The following book is particularly important because its author is now a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, although there are several social scientists and some risk analysts who believe that it is too simplistic. The following is a seminal paper which, in particular, describes how people accept risks differently when they are arising from voluntary actions and involuntary actions. One of the most important and influential books was that by Rachel Carson who pointed out that while use of pesticides has improved human welfare, indiscriminate use has brought risk and hazards. This conclusion, now almost universally accepted, was a spark for major public concern about environmental risks. The following books were more polemical in character but emphasize the concerns that any risk analyst must face. 
IV. PERCEPTION OF RISKS
A universal complaint of professional risk analysts is that it is difficult to get the general public, the politicians they elect, and the bureaucrats they appoint, to understand the relative magnitude of risks. Perhaps the discrepancy between an expert's judgment and the lay judgment is larger when they are judgments about nuclear power than in other decisions. Any decision maker, individual, corporate executive or government bureaucrat ignores public perception and the lay judgment at his or her peril. In this section I discuss several important papers about public perception. The most important and perceptive of these are a set of four papers by the late Amos Tversky and collaborators. The first two of these papers are general discussions. In the third of these papers the authors show that the way people perceive risks, at least when asked about them, depends very critically upon the way the question is framed or posed. In one example Tversky and Kahneman ask students to assume that the U.S. is preparing for an outbreak of a disease imported from Asia and that two alternative programs, A and B, have been suggested. If program A is adopted 200 people would be saved but if program B is adopted there is a 1 in 3 chance that 600 will be saved and 2 in 3 chance that no one will be saved. 72% of students chose A and 28% chose B. That more students chose the definite result, rather than a risky prospect with the same expectation, is surprising to few people. Another group of students was given a different formulation of the alternative programs. If program C is adopted 400 people will die. If program D is adopted there is a 1/3 probability that no one will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 would die. A moment's arithmetic tells us that C and D are the same as A and B, the choice being expressed as people dying rather than people being saved. Yet the students' choice was inverted. 78% of the students chose program D. In the first presentation the problem was presented as a choice between gains. Then the students were risk averse. In the second it appeared as a choice between losses and the students were risk takers. In the fourth paper the authors show that a risk that might be acceptable when looked at in aggregate can become unacceptable when broken down into its individual parts. In buying an old car there is a risk that it might break down. Many people would accept that risk. But the same people might be overwhelmed when a long list is presented of the ways it might break down! One of the very fundamental rules about scientific inference is Bayes' theorem, named after Reverend Bayes who discussed the matter in the eighteenth century. This discusses how new information may be combined with older information to arrive at a combined result. But this seems to be very difficult to understand in real situations. The following paper discusses, inter alia, a common parlor game that depends upon how to use prior knowledge when estimating a probability, and shows how even Nobel Laureates are often confused. This is connected with a failure to understand contingent probability. An excellent example of contingent risk is the risk to which an individual would be exposed by a plutoniumpowered space probe hitting the earth on a ''swing-by'' when calculated as a product of the probability of reentry and the probability of the individual developing cancer as a result of plutonium spreading throughout the world. Although the calculation puts this at a minuscule level of about 10
Ϫ13
, there were over 100 websites opposing, on this ground, the launching of the Cassini Space Probe. I refer here to the interagency review. 
V. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
A statement about risk is not a statement about an event that is certain to occur. It is a statement about how likely the event, or sequence of events, will occur. Therefore the very use of the word is involved with uncertainty. The whole ''theory of error'' that is a cornerstone of a physicist's education is central to risk analysis. However, the word ''error'' is not used, because it has a pejorative connotation. Indeed, it is said that when a physician hears the word ''error'' he calls his lawyer at once! This is the most useful work for risk analysts.
Uncertainty: A Guide to Dealing with Uncertainty in Quantitative
Risk and Policy Analysis, M. G. Morgan and M. Henrion ͑Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1990͒. ͑A͒
The uncertainty attached to any assessment of a risk is an estimate by the person making the assessment. But extensive experience shows that when people try to understand risks, and assign an uncertainty to the numerical value that they attach, the quoted uncertainty increases. This applies even for experts. For example, Morgan and Keith assembled a group of climate experts to discuss the uncertainties attached to a single parameter-the prediction of temperature rise if
were asked what they believed the uncertainty range would be at the end of the research program. Instead of decreasing, they thought that the uncertainty range would increase! Of course it is the perception of the uncertainty that increases. Every physical scientist is taught to address uncertainty to the best of his or her ability. However, the record shows that all scientists tend to be overoptimistic about their own studies. Some contributions to uncertainty are unsuspected. This overoptimism exists in all fields, from straightforward measurement of physical parameters to understanding cancer risks. The following author discusses how one might take them into account.
54. ''An improved framework for uncertainty analysis: accounting for unsuspected errors,'' A. I. Shlyakhter, Risk Anal. 14, 441-447 ͑1994͒. ͑I͒
VI. RISK AT LOW DOSES
Most people would like risks and hazards to be presented to them in a binary way: yes, it is safe, or no, it is dangerous. But the world is not built that way. Most of us now know that there are a large number of substances that are carcinogenic ͑can produce cancer͒ but what happens when we consume small amounts of these substances? This question is an old one. Scientists refer to the physician Paracelsus, who ͑freely translated͒ said, ''The dose makes the poison.'' But others still search for an unattainable zero risk and zero dose. Physicists are used to statistical discussion of small effects but biologists and toxicologists often insist that there must be a threshold below which a toxic ͑or carcinogenic͒ agent can cause no harm. This is well discussed by Arthur Upton. If the medical outcome of exposure to a substance is an increase in the frequency or probability of a common medical ailment, then a simple application of Taylor's theorem suggests that a small dose produces a small ͑incremental͒ risk. Although first discussed for cancer this argument applies to many other problems such as the effect of air pollution. A major recent development is a scientific discussion of hormesis. This ill-defined concept means that at moderate doses of an agent the probability of the medical outcome falls, although it may rise again at higher doses in a U-shaped curve. One can consider two distinct types of hormesis. The first when one medical outcome falls with increasing dose and another rises and the combination gives an overall U-shaped curve. The second type is when the probability of the same medical outcome falls and then rises. The most obvious example of the first type of hormesis is alcohol. At doses of up to one or two drinks a day it considerably reduces the risk of stroke. At higher doses lip cancer is seen ͑in synergism with cigarette smoking͒ and at still higher doses it is narcotic and habit-forming with all the catastrophic effects of alcoholism. A well-known example is the cancers caused by dioxin (tetra-chloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin). The animal data show a decrease in all cancers as the dose is increased, followed by a marked increase in liver cancers as the dose is increased further, although the rate of other cancers continues to decline. This is certainly a case of the first type of hormesis, and if the decrease in liver cancers at the intermediate dose is correct, then it is also a case of the second type of hormesis.
However, a distinguished epidemiologist challenges Cohen's result and implicitly all other ''ecological'' studies where health effects averaged over a population are compared with average concentrations. 
VII. MAJOR PUBLIC MISCONCEPTIONS
There are a number of situations where there is a persistent difference between the perception of a risk by a large fraction of the public and the perception by expert analysts. These try the patience of scientists and risk analysts, but without patience no progress can be made. For example, it is widely believed that in industrial activity, both occupational hazards and environmental pollution are major causes of cancer. Two British experts ͑both knighted by the Queen for their work͒ have described what they believe is a correct answer. Ever since Dr. Snow found a cluster of victims around a pump in London, epidemiologists have looked for clusters of diseased and used them to locate the cause and prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Some disease clusters occur by chance. In particular, cancer is ͑mostly͒ not an infectious disease, and clusters of cancer cases are almost always due to chance. However, if a person is a member of such a cluster, he or she often does not think that it is due to chance. Below is an important paper by a physician working for the California department of health whose job includes explaining these facts to the public. Ever since the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the guilt feelings that accompanied them, there has been a perception that radiation is uniquely dangerous. There is a huge literature on exaggerated claims, but comparatively few line-by-line refutations that are comprehensible. 
VIII. COSTS TO REDUCE A HAZARD
Risk-Benefit Analysis is a subset of decision theory. It is useful therefore to know the rudiments of that theory. I have found nothing superior to the following book. on the matter at issue. In three landmark cases the role of expert witnesses was elucidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Again a scientist is well advised to read the original opinions.
